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THE NEXT BATTLEGROUND? PERSONHOOD,
PRIVACY, AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
MARK STRASSER*
I. Introduction
Personhood statutes and amendments have been proposed in several
states.1 Generally, they establish as a matter of law that legal personhood
begins at conception. Such laws may have implications for state policies
concerning abortion and contraception, depending upon whether or how
certain murky issues in current privacy jurisprudence are ultimately
resolved, and will have implications for other areas of law including state
policies related to assisted reproductive technologies. Yet, some of the ways
these different areas of law might be affected are not well understood.
Part II of this article discusses current privacy jurisprudence, suggesting
that abortion jurisprudence has become destabilized and that personhood
amendments could limit access to abortion, or even contraception, if
privacy jurisprudence continues down certain paths suggested in the case
law. Part III discusses some of the ways assisted reproductive technologies
jurisprudence would be affected in states adopting personhood
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. I
would like to thank Professor Susan Looper-Friedman for her discussions of these and
related issues.
1. See, e.g., John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendment Processes and the
Safeguards of American Federalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1007, 1024-25 (2011)
(discussing personhood amendment ballots in Colorado and Mississippi); Sean Murphy,
‘Personhood’ For Embryos Sought: November Election Measures Proposed, OKLAHOMAN,
Jan. 17, 2012, at 11A (“A ballot measure that would criminalize abortion by granting
‘personhood’ status to a human embryo is one of nearly a dozen proposals that Oklahoma
lawmakers want to send to voters in November.”).
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amendments. This article concludes that personhood amendments, if
adopted, might affect existing law in a number of ways that are neither
adequately discussed in legal or popular literature nor adequately
appreciated by the very individuals voting on whether to adopt such
amendments.
II. Privacy Jurisprudence
Current right to privacy jurisprudence protects rights to contraception
and abortion.2 State laws declaring that personhood begins at conception
would not in themselves modify federal guarantees, and thus such laws
appear to pose no threat to privacy rights guaranteed by the federal
constitution. However, current privacy jurisprudence is in flux and such
amendments might affect the breadth of rights to abortion and contraception
depending upon developments in case law. In any event, a modification in
privacy jurisprudence, for example, because of a change in the Supreme
Court’s composition, could greatly increase the legal effects of personhood
legislation.
A. Abortion Jurisprudence
Roe v. Wade is the foundational case in current abortion rights
jurisprudence.3 There, the Court held not only that there was a
constitutionally protected right to obtain an abortion without undue
interference from the State, but also that the states were precluded from
legislatively defining the status of the fetus in such a way as to undermine
the right to abortion.4
At issue in Roe was a Texas law prohibiting abortion unless performed to
save the pregnant woman’s life.5 Jane Roe6 sought a declaratory judgment
that the Texas statute was unconstitutional.7 Roe could not obtain a safe,

2. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
3. See 410 U.S. 113.
4. Id. at 162-64.
5. Id. at 117-18.
6. “Jane Roe” was a pseudonym. Id. at 120 n.4. The woman’s real name was Norma
McCorvey. Lynn M. Paltrow, Missed Opportunities in McCorvey v. Hill: The Limits of ProChoice Lawyering, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 194, 196 (2011) (discussing “Norma
McCorvey, the original ‘Jane Roe’ in Roe v. Wade”).
7. Roe, 410 U.S. at 122.
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legal abortion in Texas and was too poor to travel to another state to obtain
one.8
The Court addressed the State’s interest in “protecting prenatal life,”
including “the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of
conception.”9 Such a theory might be thought to suggest that “[o]nly when
the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life
she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not
prevail.”10 However, the Court offered two reasons to reject that such a
theory should govern when abortions are permissible.
First, the Court denied that it was clear human life begins at the moment
of conception.11 The Court discussed the
confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and
canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines
variously approached the question in terms of the point at which
the embryo or fetus became “formed” or recognizably human, or
in terms of when a “person” came into being, that is, infused
with a “soul” or “animated.” A loose consensus evolved in early
English law that these events occurred at some point between
conception and live birth.12
Thus, the consensus was not that the fetus’s life began at conception.13
Instead, although there was agreement that the fetus’s life began sometime
before birth, there was no consensus about the particular point during the
pregnancy at which life began.14 Indeed, the Court noted that according to
some traditions, life began earlier for males than for females.15 This lack of
agreement that life began at conception undercut the claim that the
Constitution embodied such an understanding.
Regardless of when the fetus’s life might be thought to begin, a separate
question is whether the fetus is a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Roe Court suggested that the resolution of the fetus’s
personhood could be dispositive with respect to whether the Constitution

8. Id. at 120.
9. Id. at 150.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 133.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 134 (“Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of
animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female.”).
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protected the right to obtain an abortion because if “personhood [was]
established, the appellant’s case . . . collapse[d], for the fetus’ right to life
would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.”16
Yet, it is not at all clear that States would be precluded from permitting
abortions in non-life-threatening circumstances, even if the fetus were a
person for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. As Professor Gelman pointed
out, the right to self-defense is triggered not only when one’s life is
endangered, but also when one’s health is in need of protection.17 But if
self-defense includes the right to protect one’s health, then self-defense
might be used to justify a woman obtaining an abortion both when
continuing the pregnancy would endanger her life and under other
circumstances. Further, there is no requirement that the individual posing a
serious threat of harm have the subjective intent to produce the endangered
person’s injury or death.18 For example, an individual who is delusional
(and thus might not intend to harm another human being) may be subjected
to lethal force if that person nonetheless poses a threat of serious harm.19
The self-defense rationale would seem to justify an abortion in a case in
which the pregnancy posed severe but non-life-threatening risks to health.20
16. Id. at 156-57.
17. Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original Meaning, Historical
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV.
585, 698 (1994) (discussing “the historic right of life, which includes limb, health, and
indolency of body”).
18. See Stephen G. Gilles, Roe’s Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or RelativeSafety? 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 525, 537 (2010) (“It could be argued that the analogy is
defective because fetuses, far from being deliberate aggressors, are entirely innocent—
indeed, are not even voluntary actors.”).
19. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
339 n.127 (2007) (“States can certainly allow for self-defense, even against so-called
‘innocent attackers’ who don’t realize the threat they pose to others.”); Sherry F. Colb, To
Whom Do We Refer When We Speak of Obligations to “Future Generations”? Reproductive
Rights and the Intergenerational Community, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1582, 1608 (2009)
(“In law and in moral philosophy, however, it is widely accepted that the justification of
self-defense does not depend on the guilt or culpability of the ‘attacker.’”); Gilles, supra
note 18, at 537 (“Self-defense law generally authorizes the use of deadly force if an actor
reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.”).
20. Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this point. See Caitlin E. Borgmann,
The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 551, 565 (2009) (“[A] non-life-saving abortion is unlawful lethal force if the embryo or
fetus is a person, because the embryo or fetus did not exert lethal force against the
woman.”); Lawrence J. Nelson, Of Persons and Prenatal Humans: Why the Constitution Is
Not Silent on Abortion, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 170 (2009) (“If prenatal humans are
constitutional persons, . . . the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, combined with other
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However, while recognition of fetal personhood might not limit abortion
permissibility to only when the pregnant woman’s life was endangered,
recognition of fetal personhood would nonetheless significantly modify the
current jurisprudence. Because the use of lethal self-defense requires
proportionality so that the user of force would have suffered serious harm
had the defense not been employed,21 such a model would require a
showing of potential harm that is not now required for abortions before the
fetus has attained viability.22
In any event, it was not necessary for the Court to decide the degree to
which the Fourteenth Amendment imposed limits on abortion rights. The
Roe Court found both that the fetus was not a person for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment23 and that the right to obtain an abortion was
protected by the right to privacy.24 However, the Court’s holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected abortion, but not the fetus, did not mean
that abortion had to be provided on demand25 because the State had
interests in protecting “potential life.”26 Because of the “important state
interests in regulation,” the right to abortion “is not unqualified.”27
There are two distinct state interests justifying the regulation of abortion:
(1) protecting the life and health of the pregnant woman and (2) protecting
the potential life represented by the fetus.28 The Roe Court explained that
standard legal doctrines, would require the State to ban all abortions—even those necessary
to save the life of the mother.”).
21. See Commonwealth v. Demapan, 2008 MP 16, ¶ 29, No. 4-0006-GA, 2008 WL
3982060, at *8 (N. Mar. I., Aug. 15, 2008) (“[I]n order to justifiably claim self-defense in
exercising physical force, the following factors must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must
have a reasonable fear of imminent danger; (2) the defendant may only use force against an
unlawful aggressor; (3) the defendant’s use of force must be necessary; and (4) the
defendant’s use of force must be proportional to the aggressor’s use of force.”).
22. Current jurisprudence suggests that a State cannot prohibit abortion of a viable fetus
unless it includes an exception to protect the health of the pregnant woman. See Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 879 (1992)).
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
24. Id. at 153 (noting that the “right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).
25. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so.”).
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150.
27. Id. at 154.
28. See id. at 170.
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“[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health
of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.”29 The Court
reasoned that “until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may
be less than mortality in normal childbirth.”30 After that “a State may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health,” such as by
regulating who might perform the abortion and where it might be
performed.31
The State also has an interest in protecting the fetus itself, which
increases in significance as the pregnancy progresses.32 The Court noted,
“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s
womb.”33 Once the fetus is viable, the State “may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.”34 However, after announcing this basic framework
for analyzing abortion regulation, the Roe Court explained that a State
could not “override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake”
through the expedient method of “adopting one theory of life,” for example,
by passing legislation declaring that life begins at conception.35
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court again examined
the effect of a state definition of when life began.36 At issue was a provision
containing “‘findings’ by the [Missouri] state legislature that ‘[t]he life of
each human being begins at conception,’ and that ‘unborn children have
protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.’”37 The Act provided
that “all Missouri laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with the
same rights enjoyed by other persons, subject to the Federal Constitution
and this Court’s precedents.”38
The Webster Court made clear how such a statute should be construed.
While a State cannot “‘justify’ an abortion regulation otherwise invalid
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 163-64.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 162.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Id. at 501 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).
Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2).
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under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied the State’s view about
when life begins,”39 such a limitation does not preclude a State from
affording “protections to unborn children in tort and probate law.”40
As a separate matter, the Webster plurality expressed misgivings about
Roe’s trimester framework, noting that “the rigid Roe framework is hardly
consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is,
and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does.”41 Those
misgivings were cited with approval by the plurality in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the trimester framework was
rejected.42
The plurality in Casey rejected the “rigid” trimester framework because
it was not necessary to assure that “the woman’s right to choose [would]
not become so subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting fetal life that
her choice exists in theory but not in fact.”43 Nonetheless, the Casey
plurality claimed to reaffirm the three parts of “Roe’s essential holding”:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
interference from the State. . . . Second is a confirmation of the
State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the
woman’s life or health. And third is the principle that the State
has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that
may become a child.44
The Court focused on viability for a few different reasons. First, some of
the factual predicate had changed in the intervening years.45 The Court
explained that “time ha[d] overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions:
advances in maternal health care allow[ed] for abortions safe to the mother
later in pregnancy than was true in 1973.”46 Further, “advances in neonatal
39. Id. at 506 (explaining dictum in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 518.
42. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 518).
43. Id. at 872.
44. Id. at 846.
45. See id. at 860.
46. Id. (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 429
n.11 (1983)).
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care ha[d] advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier.”47 However, the
plurality did not believe that the medical advances undermined the central
holding that “viability mark[ed] the earliest point at which the State’s
interest in fetal life [was] constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”48 To some extent, the Casey plurality
focused on viability for the sake of drawing a line that would be clear to the
states and to the courts. “Liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line
that is clear.”49
The Casey plurality understood that “abortion regulations interfere to
some degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy,” and offered “the undue burden standard [as] the appropriate
means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally
protected liberty.”50 However, unless spelled out more clearly, such a
standard will not afford much protection for liberty. The plurality offered
the following definition: “An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision
of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”51
The “purpose or effect” language seems to offer robust protections for
early abortions, although the Casey plurality was not thereby prohibiting all
regulation of abortions prior to fetal viability. The Court held that:
Regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn
are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.52
Thus, the State is permitted to express its strong preference for life as long
as it does not impose too great a burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an
abortion by doing so.
Casey was cited with approval in Stenberg v. Carhart, where the Court
refused to “revisit” the principles laid down in Roe and Casey and instead
sought to “apply them to the circumstances.”53 At issue was a Nebraska law
47. Id. (comparing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973), with Webster, 492 U.S. at
515-16).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 869.
50. Id. at 875-76.
51. Id. at 878.
52. Id. at 877.
53. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).
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prohibiting partial birth abortions.54 The Court cited two reasons that the
statute did not pass muster.55 First, the statute did not include “any
exception ‘for the preservation of the . . . health of the mother.’”56 Second,
the law was deemed to “unduly burden[] the right to choose abortion itself,”
at least in part, because “Nebraska’s law applie[d] both previability and
postviability.”57
The Nebraska litigation implicated two distinct constitutional issues.
First, the Nebraska statute failed to draw a line making clear that the
prohibition at issue only applied to fetuses that had attained viability.58
Second, Nebraska did not ban abortion as a general matter but, instead,
“ban[ned] one method of aborting a pregnancy.”59 The statute’s ban on one
kind of abortion might be thought to militate in favor of its constitutionality
because other abortion options were also available.60 Or, it might be thought
to militate in favor of the ban’s unconstitutionality because the State was
unlikely to save the lives of any fetuses through the ban.61 The Stenberg
Court offered the latter analysis, reasoning that “[t]he Nebraska law, of
course, does not directly further an interest ‘in the potentiality of human
life’ by saving the fetus in question from destruction, as it regulates only a
method of performing abortion.”62 Thus, the statute did not directly further
the State’s interest in protecting fetal life because it did not regulate
whether particular fetuses would be aborted, only which method would be
used.63
Consider two of the options that might be utilized by a woman seeking a
late-term abortion. In the dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure,
“instruments are inserted through the cervix into the uterus to remov[e]
fetal and placental tissue.”64 Basically, the doctor performing the procedure
uses the “instruments to grasp a portion (such as a foot or hand) of a
developed and living fetus and drag the grasped portion out of the uterus
into the vagina.”65 The doctor then “uses the traction created by the opening
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 930.
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 923.
See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
Id.
Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 958 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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between the uterus and vagina to dismember the fetus, tearing the grasped
portion away from the remainder of the body.”66 Justice Kennedy noted in
his dissent that “[t]he fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or
child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb.”67
The Court distinguished this D&E procedure, which Nebraska permitted,
from the “intact D&E” procedure,68 which included both the dilation and
extraction (D&X) and partial birth abortion procedures that Nebraska
prohibited.69 The intact D&E procedure “involves removing the fetus from
the uterus through the cervix ‘intact,’ i.e., in one pass, rather than in several
passes.”70 Then, “[i]f the fetus presents head first (a vertex presentation),
the doctor collapses the skull; and the doctor then extracts the entire fetus
through the cervix” (D&X).71 If, instead, “the fetus presents feet first (a
breech presentation), the doctor pulls the fetal body through the cervix,
collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus through the cervix” (partial
birth).72
Needless to say, both procedures are “gruesome,” and it is not at all clear
that one is closer to infanticide than the other.73 That said, however, one
procedure posed more risks in certain cases than the other.74 The Court
noted that “[t]he D&E procedure carries certain risks. The use of
instruments within the uterus creates a danger of accidental perforation and
damage to neighboring organs. Sharp fetal bone fragments create similar
dangers. And fetal tissue accidentally left behind can cause infection and
various other complications.”75

66. Id.
67. Id. at 958-59.
68. Id. at 927 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 928 (“Despite the technical differences we have just described, intact D&E
and D&X are sufficiently similar for us to use the terms interchangeably.”).
70. Id. at 927.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For the notion that either of these two
equally gruesome procedures performed at this late stage of gestation is more akin to
infanticide than the other, or that the State furthers any legitimate interest by banning one but
not the other, is simply irrational.”).
74. See id. at 932 (majority opinion) (“On the basis of medical testimony the District
Court concluded that ‘Carhart’s D&X procedure is . . . safer tha[n] the D&E and other
abortion procedures used during the relevant gestational period in the 10 to 20 cases a year
that present to Dr. Carhart.’” (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d, 1099, 1126 (D.
Neb. 1998))).
75. Id. at 926.
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After noting that “the record shows that significant medical authority
supports the proposition that in some circumstances, D&X would be the
safest procedure,” the Court struck down the Nebraska ban.76 The Court
feared that the State’s “banning D&X without a health exception
[might] . . . create significant health risks for women.”77
An important issue dividing the Court was whether the prohibited
procedure was ever “necessary” to preserve the life or health of the
mother.78 The Court noted that the medical community was also divided on
this point and that there were “highly qualified knowledgeable experts on
both sides of the issue.”79
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy claimed that “the law denies no woman
the right to choose an abortion and places no undue burden upon the
right.”80 He argued that “Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a
greater risk of disrespect for life and a consequent greater risk to the
profession and society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal
recognition of dignity and respect.”81 Justice Kennedy rejected that the
relevant question was whether one procedure was safer than another for a
particular class of women.82 Instead, he argued that the dispositive
consideration was that the statute “deprived no woman of a safe abortion
and therefore did not impose a substantial obstacle on the rights of any
woman.”83
While Stenberg seems relatively straightforward, its proper interpretation
becomes more complicated when considered in light of the Court’s
subsequent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which involved a federal
partial birth abortion prohibition.84 While the Nebraska statute and the
federal statute differed in language,85 the fatal defects in Stenberg were not
fatal in Gonzales.86 For example, the federal ban applied whether or not the

76. Id. at 932.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 937.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 963.
82. Id. at 967 (“The most to be said for the D&X is it may present an unquantified lower
risk of complication for a particular patient . . . .”).
83. Id. at 965.
84. See 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007).
85. Id. (“[T]he Act’s language differs from that of the Nebraska statute struck down in
Stenberg.”).
86. Id. at 168.
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fetus was viable.87 While the Gonzales Court affirmed Casey’s holding that
a State “may not impose upon this right an undue burden, which exists if a
regulation’s ‘purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability,’”88 the
Court nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of the federal ban, reversing
those circuit courts that had struck it down.89
The Gonzales Court noted “that the State, from the inception of the
pregnancy, maintains its own regulatory interest in protecting the life of the
fetus that may become a child,” and argued that the state interest in fetal life
“cannot be set at naught by interpreting Casey’s requirement of a health
exception so it becomes tantamount to allowing a doctor to choose the
abortion method he or she might prefer.”90 Instead, the Court reasoned that
where the State
has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue
burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its
legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order
to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.91
The Court did not offer any criteria to help determine which procedures
might be thought to count as substitutes for others. To illustrate why that
failure might be thought important, one need only suppose that there are
certain health risks associated with performing a particular type of abortion,
different health risks associated with a different type of abortion, and still
different health risks posed by carrying the fetus to term. The Court has not
explained the conditions necessary for one of those abortion methods to be
barred—for example, what sorts of increased risks might acceptably be
imposed by a State wishing to promote respect for life without thereby
creating an undue burden on the right to abort. Nor has the Court explained
under what conditions the State could ban both abortion methods without
imposing an undue burden. For example, a State might justify prohibiting
both types of abortion where both present certain health risks that would not
be presented by carrying the fetus to term, notwithstanding certain other

87. Id. at 147 (“The Act does apply both previability and postviability . . . .”).
88. Id. at 146 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878
(1992)).
89. Id. at 167-68.
90. Id. at 158.
91. Id.
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difficulties of carrying the fetus to term that are not presented by either type
of abortion.92
As had also been true in Stenberg, Gonzales included testimony “that
intact D&E decreases the risk of cervical laceration or uterine perforation
because it requires fewer passes into the uterus with surgical instruments
and does not require the removal of bony fragments of the dismembered
fetus, fragments that may be sharp.”93 In addition, evidence was presented
that “intact D&E was safer both because it reduces the risks that fetal parts
will remain in the uterus and because it takes less time to complete.”94
Finally, further evidence was presented to show that “intact D&E was safer
for women with certain medical conditions or women with fetuses that had
certain anomalies.”95 However, there was testimony in both Stenberg and
Gonzales by other experts disputing these conclusions.96 The Court posed
the issue in the following way: “The question becomes whether the Act can
stand when this medical uncertainty persists.”97 However, this time the
Court suggested that “state and federal legislatures [should be given] wide
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty.”98
The Stenberg Court viewed the medical uncertainty over whether the
partial birth abortion ban created substantial risks as a reason to strike down
the ban:
[T]he uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who
believe that D&X is a safer abortion method in certain
circumstances may turn out to be right. If so, then the absence of
a health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of
tragic health consequences. If they are wrong, the exception will
simply turn out to have been unnecessary.99
In contrast, the Gonzales Court concluded: “The medical uncertainty over
whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health risks provides a

92. Cf. Gilles, supra note 18, at 527 (“The self-defense approach would rarely block the
application of a ban on postviability abortions because very few pregnancies nowadays pose
grave dangers of death or serious health impairment that can only be avoided by abortion.”).
93. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 162.
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id.
99. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000).
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sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose
an undue burden.”100
In her Gonzales dissent, Justice Ginsburg described the majority opinion
as “alarming.”101 Charging that the Court did not “take Casey and Stenberg
seriously,” she noted both that the Gonzales opinion “blurs the line, firmly
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions” and that
it “blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s
health.”102 She also addressed the lack of consensus in the medical
community about the need for this kind of abortion, noting several
organizations that had attested to the additional safety afforded by this
technique.103
To make the case for the necessity of providing the intact D&E
alternative even stronger, Justice Ginsberg noted “the District Courts’ wellsupported findings” that many of those claiming there was no need for this
option “had no training for, or personal experience with, the intact D&E
procedure, and . . . performed abortions only on rare occasions.”104 She
compared the permissible abortions to impermissible partial birth abortion,
suggesting that permissible abortions would likely undermine respect for
life as much as the impermissible abortion did.105 Noting that the Court’s
analysis was motivated by “moral concerns” and that such concerns “could
yield prohibitions on any abortion,”106 she worried that other forms of lateterm abortion might also be at risk.107 Justice Ginsberg’s final observation
100. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 164.
101. Id. at 170 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 170-71.
103. Id. at 176 (“[T]he congressional record includes letters from numerous individual
physicians stating that pregnant women’s health would be jeopardized under the Act, as well
as statements from nine professional associations, including ACOG [American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists], the American Public Health Association, and the
California Medical Association, attesting that intact D&E carries meaningful safety
advantages over other methods.”).
104. Id. at 180.
105. Id. at 182 (“Delivery of an intact, albeit nonviable, fetus warrants special
condemnation, the Court maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered resembles an
infant. But so, too, does a fetus delivered intact after it is terminated by injection a day or
two before the surgical evacuation, or a fetus delivered through medical induction or
cesarean. Yet, the availability of those procedures—along with D&E by dismemberment—
the Court says, saves the ban on intact D&E from a declaration of unconstitutionality.”
(citations omitted)).
106. Id.
107. See id. at 186 (suggesting that the prohibition of the D&E procedure might also be
upheld).
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was that there had been a change in the composition of the Court since
Stenberg had been decided, which might have accounted for Gonzales
having been decided differently.108
At least two points might be made about Justice Ginsberg’s reference to
the Court’s composition. First, if there is another change on the Court, for
example, if Justice Ginsberg retires, then the abortion jurisprudence may
undergo a wholesale revision. Suppose that the post-Ginsberg Court were to
hold that the Federal Constitution neither protects nor prohibits abortion,
but instead permits the States to regulate it as they deem fit.109 In that event,
the personhood amendments would do a significant amount of work
because even very early abortions would be impermissible unless, for
example, a plausible self-defense argument could be offered. While it is
unclear which medical conditions would be interpreted as sufficiently
threatening to justify an abortion in a state in which personhood begins at
conception,110 it is clear that many abortions would simply not be
permissible.111
Second, even if no Justices retire for the foreseeable future, abortion
jurisprudence remains in doubt. Two of the key elements of the abortion
doctrine recognized in Casey and affirmed in Stenberg, namely, the undue
burden test for abortion of pre-viable fetuses and the necessity of having a
108. Id. at 191 (“[T]he Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered
a restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations of ‘the rule of
law’ and the ‘principles of stare decisis.’”). Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in
Stenberg, while Justice Alito, signed onto Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Gonzales.
See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 947-51 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Gonzales, 550
U.S. at 130. Justice Alito currently holds the seat formerly occupied by Justice O’Connor.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 53 (2012)
(discussing “the replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice Alito”).
109. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The States may, if they wish,
permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The
permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important
questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.”).
110. For example, Professor Borgmann implies that abortions would be impermissible
unless performed to save the life of the pregnant woman. See Borgmann, supra note 20, at
567 (“Where a woman’s life is not at risk, nine months of pregnancy (and perhaps non-lifethreatening health consequences) must be weighed against a person’s life. This does not
seem to meet the requirements for a necessity defense.”).
111. Cf. Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called “Partial-Birth Abortion” Bans: Bad
Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely! 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 301, 321-22 (1998)
(“[A]bortion rights leaders have acknowledged that a large percentage of pre-viability D&X
cases, like the overwhelming percentage of pre-viability abortions, generally, are elective
procedures involving healthy women and fetuses.”).
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health exception in laws prohibiting post-viable abortions, no longer seem
so firmly grounded. After Gonzales, it simply is not clear where the bright
lines will be drawn to protect abortion rights.
The Stenberg Court noted that it had “repeatedly invalidated statutes that
in the process of regulating the methods of abortion, imposed significant
health risks.”112 Basically, for purposes of the relevant constitutional
guarantees, “a risk to a women’s [sic] health is the same whether it happens
to arise from regulating a particular method of abortion, or from barring
abortion entirely.”113 But if that is so, then the Gonzales Court’s upholding
of a ban on a particular type of abortion could be used to justify upholding a
statute that banned abortions more generally.
It is fair to suggest that Stenberg and Gonzales can be read in ways that
do not pose such dangers for abortion jurisprudence. If one takes the Court
at its word that it did not believe the prohibition of partial birth abortions
posed an undue burden on the ability to get an abortion or, more generally,
on women’s health, then perhaps the Court will not permit further
incursions on the right to abortion. In that event, a State having passed a
personhood amendment would not affect existing abortion rights.114
It is also true, however, that the current jurisprudence might permit
further incursions on abortion rights. Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the
regret that a woman might feel after having had an abortion might be used
to justify additional limitations.115 Further, some commentators have
pointed to studies showing an increased suicide rate116 or an increased rate

112. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931.
113. Id.
114. See Rita M. Dunaway, The Personhood Strategy: A State’s Prerogative to Take
Back Abortion Law, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 327, 327-28 (2011) (“A State’s conferral of
legal personhood upon unborn human beings would not, on its own, affect a woman’s
existing abortion rights.”); Juliana Vines Crist, Note, The Myth of Fetal Personhood:
Reconciling Roe and Fetal Homicide Laws, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 867 (2010) (“The
Supreme Court has already made clear that the fetus is not a ‘person’ under the Constitution,
and thus is not entitled to protection from deprivation of ‘life, liberty, . . . [or] equal
protection of the laws.’ Legislatures cannot declare otherwise, since this would be in
derogation of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.”
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
115. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
116. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Transporting Minors for Immoral Purposes: The
Case for the Child Custody Protection Act & the Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act,
16 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 137 (2006) (“Two studies, one from the United States and the other
from Finland, have shown surprising increased rates of suicide following abortion.”).
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of complications in later pregnancies among those who have had
abortions.117 Such statistics might be used to justify additional limitations.
One of the reasons that Casey focused on viability was to set a bright line
for the states and the courts.118 It is unclear whether Gonzales has now
undermined the importance of that line. Because the partial birth abortion
statute upheld in Gonzales applied to abortions involving both pre-viable
and post-viable fetuses,119 it is not clear as a matter of abortion
jurisprudence whether that clear line has become murky or whether,
instead, the Court was applying the existing jurisprudence and finding as a
matter of law that no undue burden was imposed by precluding this
particular type of abortion.
Either way, abortion jurisprudence feels more precarious.120 If the previability/post-viability line has now been erased, then it is not clear what
bright line will be adopted in its stead. Further, until a new line is firmly in

117. See David C. Reardon, Thomas W. Strahan, John M. Thorp, Jr. & Martha W.
Shuping, Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to Childbirth—A Review of New and
Old Data and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279,
316-17 (2004) (“It is also known that induced abortion is associated with a subsequent risk
of placenta previa and premature delivery. Increased rates of genital tract infection, pelvic
inflammatory disease, endometritis, ectopic pregnancy, retained placenta, preeclampsia, and
other complications of pregnancy and delivery in subsequent pregnancies have also been
identified in the literature. All of these complications are associated with higher risk of
maternal and neonatal death. Even if these deaths are actually traceable to latent abortion
morbidity (scarring of the uterus, for example), these deaths would be classified as maternal
deaths rather than abortion-related deaths, and would therefore confound the comparison of
mortality rates between abortion and delivery.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Reva B.
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions under Casey/Carhart,
117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1703 (2008) (“Those who would ban abortion now assert that
restrictions on abortion protect women’s health and freedom and promote their ‘informed
consent.’ The strategy is designed to erode the protections for women’s decisions set forth in
Roe and Casey, and the passing discussion of postabortion regret in Carhart suggests it may
yet succeed.”).
118. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
119. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147.
120. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (“We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line
other than viability which is more workable.”). Some commentators do not seem to
appreciate the instability of current abortion jurisprudence and thus the difficulties that might
be created by personhood amendments or, perhaps, by legislative weighing of the value of
unborn life and the alleged risks posed by abortion. See, e.g., Crist, supra note 114, at 869
(“States are free to communicate their opinions on when life begins. However, such opinions
do not confer personhood or challenge abortion rights. They are merely value judgments that
do not, and because of the Supremacy Clause, cannot, threaten abortion jurisprudence.”
(footnote omitted)).
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place, states may feel tempted to adopt more and more restrictive
legislation, if only to clarify which abortions may be restricted or prohibited
without violating constitutional guarantees.
Suppose, however, that the Court is not creating a new bright line, but is
instead still enforcing the undue burden test for abortion involving previable fetuses. Even so, Gonzales provides a basis for upholding other
attempts to restrict abortions of pre-viable fetuses, for example, by claiming
that the availability of other alternatives would prevent the prohibition at
issue from being an undue burden.121 Further, given the diversity of opinion
that exists about the relative safety of abortion, it would not be surprising to
see some argue that abortion is not as safe in some cases as the alternative
of childbirth.122 Because the Court has already suggested that States have
“legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the
life of the fetus that may become a child,”123 and because the State “may
express profound respect for the life of the unborn”124 as long as it does not
thereby create “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to
choose,”125 the Court would already seem to have created a substantial
amount of latitude for States wishing to limit abortions of pre-viable
fetuses. Thus, the question at hand is whether, under the existing
jurisprudence, the Court might say that the undue burden test permits the
State to designate a particular set of cases in which a safe alternative to
121. See Gonzalez, 550 U.S. at 164.
122. See Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade:
Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 122 (2005)
(“When longer-term effects are taken into consideration, and speaking only about the health
of the mother, it does appear, at least in some studies, that childbirth is safer than abortion.
When deaths of women in the ensuing year after abortion are considered, the relative safety
of childbirth looks attractive.”). But see Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality,
Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 343 (2010)
(“Once pregnancy has begun, abortion is statistically safer than carrying to term until well
into the second trimester.”).
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
124. Id. at 877; see also Dunaway, supra note 114, at 336 (“[Gonzales] indicates a shift
in the balance of interests involved in abortion cases. Repeatedly, the majority reiterated the
importance of the State’s interest in ‘promoting respect for human life.’ A reading of the
majority opinion conveys, perhaps for the first time in the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence, the impression that this interest in the life of the unborn (however nebulously
described) is increasingly important relative to a woman’s ‘right’ to have an abortion. In
Justice Ginsburg’s words, the Act ‘surely would not survive under the close scrutiny that
previously attended state-decreed limitations on a woman’s reproductive choices.’” (quoting
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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abortion is childbirth.126 Accordingly, while the State would have burdened
the right to obtain an abortion, that burden would not be “undue” given the
costs and benefits of the competing procedures.127 If such an analysis wins
the day, then a huge loophole in the existing jurisprudence has already been
created.128
B. Rights to Contraception
If the right to abortion can be limited, one might wonder about the
degree to which a State can limit the right to access particular kinds of
contraception. For example, while upholding the right of married couples to
have access to contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court spent
very little time focusing on contraception itself.129 Instead, the Court spent
considerable time describing the sacredness of the marital relationship.130
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court specified the type of contraceptive at
issue that had been given to a young woman in alleged violation of local
law.131 The law at issue prohibited giving an unmarried individual “any
drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of
conception.”132 In striking down the Massachusetts law, the Eisenstadt
126. See Thomas L. Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 329, 365 (1987-88) (discussing childbirth as an alternative to abortion).
127. Cf. Dunaway, supra note 114, at 328 (“By conferring legal personhood upon the
unborn, states may ultimately change the factual-legal context in which Roe v. Wade was
decided, thereby producing a different result when a future abortion restriction is challenged.
The Supreme Court could hold that in states where the unborn are afforded all the civil rights
of persons, the woman’s privacy rights are outweighed by the unborn child’s fundamental
right to life under the state’s constitution.”).
128. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“No one would dispute that, for
many, D&E [a type of abortion not prohibited under federal law] is a procedure itself laden
with the power to devalue human life.”); Hendricks, supra note 122, at 348 (“If . . . abortion
rights are limited to the health exception, Carhart II will be used to justify a high standard of
medical risk that will substantially exceed the difference between the risks of normal
pregnancy and the risks of early abortion. Only ‘significant threat[s]’ to a woman’s health
will be adequate to overcome her duty to the fetus and the state.” (alteration in original)).
129. See 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130. Id. at 486 (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”).
131. 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (“Appellee William Baird was convicted at a bench trial
in the Massachusetts Superior Court under Massachusetts General Laws Ann., c. 272, § 21,
first, for exhibiting contraceptive articles in the course of delivering a lecture on
contraception to a group of students at Boston University and, second, for giving a young
woman a package of Emko vaginal foam at the close of his address.”).
132. Id. at 440-41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Court did not address whether access to contraception involved a
fundamental liberty interest, instead holding that “whatever the rights of the
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same
for the unmarried and the married alike.”133 Only later did the Court suggest
that contraception implicated an important liberty interest.134
Five years after issuing Eisenstadt, the Court had another opportunity to
address contraception access.135 In Carey v. Population Services
International, the Court discussed contraception rights in terms of privacy
rather than equal protection guarantees.136 At issue was a New York law
making it a crime:
(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any
kind to a minor under the age of 16 years; (2) for anyone other
than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons
16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including licensed pharmacists,
to advertise or display contraceptives.137
The Carey Court noted that “[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices.”138 While suggesting that contraception regulations that “do not
infringe protected individual choices” may pass muster, the Court explained
that “where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a
child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only
by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only
those interests.”139
The Court has long appreciated that States might try to limit abortion and
contraception rights by declaring that personhood begins at the moment of
conception. At issue in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services was the
constitutionality of several Missouri provisions, including one stating both
“that ‘[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,’ and that
‘unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing.’”140 The State had described this provision as “precatory and

133. Id. at 453.
134. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977).
135. Id. at 678.
136. See id. at 685 (“[T]he constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to an
individual’s liberty to make choices regarding contraception . . . .”).
137. Id. at 681.
138. Id. at 685.
139. Id. at 686 (alteration in original) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973)).
140. 492 U.S. 490, 501 (1989) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).
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impos[ing] no substantive restrictions on abortions.”141 The Court was
sympathetic to the claim that the provision did not limit privacy rights and
that it might merely be interpreted to offer “protections to unborn children
in tort and probate law.”142 If the provision was interpreted to limit privacy
rights in some “concrete” way, then the federal courts could address its
constitutionality.143
Justice O’Connor recognized in her Webster concurrence that the
Missouri provision declaring that personhood begins at conception could be
interpreted in a way that would limit privacy rights but was not worried
because no evidence in the record suggested that it would be applied that
way. 144 By the same token, she did not believe that it would be “applied to
prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.”145 While suggesting that
post-fertilization contraceptive devices were protected under Griswold,146
Justice O’Connor thought that “all of these intimations of
unconstitutionality are simply too hypothetical to support the use of
declaratory judgment procedures and injunctive remedies in this case.”147
Justice Blackmun was less sanguine about the effects of the provision in
question in his concurrence. Because the provision “defines fetal life as
beginning upon ‘the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a
male,’” he argued that “the provision also unconstitutionally burdens the
use of contraceptive devices, such as the IUD and the ‘morning after’ pill,
which may operate to prevent pregnancy only after conception as defined in
the statute.”148
Justice Stevens also expressed misgivings about the provision’s effects
in his Webster opinion.149 He suggested that such a limitation could not pass
141. Id. at 505.
142. Id. at 506.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 523 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A]s
with a woman’s abortion decision, nothing in the record or the opinions below indicates that
the preamble will affect a woman’s decision to practice contraception.”).
145. Id.
146. Id. (“It may be correct that the use of postfertilization contraceptive devices is
constitutionally protected by Griswold . . . .”).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An IUD is an
“intrauterine device,” which “works primarily by preventing a fertilized egg from
implanting.” Id. at 563 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotation
omitted).
149. Id. at 563 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Missouri’s
declaration therefore implies regulation not only of previability abortions, but also of
common forms of contraception such as the IUD and the morning-after pill.”).
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muster,150 although he noted a possible reading of Griswold that might have
saved the Missouri provision.151 Justice Stevens stated, “One might argue
that the Griswold holding applies to devices ‘preventing conception,’—that
is, fertilization—but not to those preventing implantation, and therefore,
that Griswold does not protect a woman’s choice to use an IUD or take a
morning-after pill.”152 However, he rejected such a distinction because he
was unaware “of any secular basis for differentiating between contraceptive
procedures that are effective immediately before and those that are effective
immediately after fertilization.”153 On the other hand, he saw “an obvious
difference between the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg
and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus
on the eve of birth.”154
The difficulty presented is that by passing a personhood amendment, a
State is implicitly denying that there is a non-arbitrary point after
conception at which personhood might be conferred, and that the point in
time at which fertilization occurs is a watershed moment.155 It is simply
unclear how many members of the current Court would view a state
declaration of personhood at the moment of conception as a legitimate and
legally defensible position.
Thus far, the Court has not employed its Gonzales approach in the
contraception context by suggesting that it is permissible for a State to
prohibit certain kinds of contraception as long as it is not thereby imposing
an undue burden on that right. Were the Court to emphasize the importance
150. Id. at 564 (“To the extent that the Missouri statute interferes with contraceptive
choices, I have no doubt that it is unconstitutional under the Court’s holdings . . . .” (citing
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))).
151. Id. at 565-66.
152. Id. at 565 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480).
153. Id. at 566.
154. Id. at 569.
155. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000) (“Millions of Americans believe
that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death
of an innocent child.”); Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion
and Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2493 (1997) (“[T]here comes into being at
conception, not a mere clump of human cells, but a distinct, unified self-integrating
organism, which develops itself, truly himself or herself, in accord with its own genetic
blueprint. The significance of genetic completeness for the status of newly conceived human
beings is that no outside genetic material is required to enable the zygote to mature into an
embryo, the embryo into a fetus, the fetus into an infant, the infant into a child, the child into
an adolescent, the adolescent into an adult. What the zygote needs to function as a distinct
self-integrating human organism, a human being, it already possesses.”).
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of promoting “respect for life, including life of the unborn,”156 and were the
Court to accept that the unborn would include not only, say, the eight-anda-half-month-old fetus but also the zygote,157 then the Court might
distinguish between permissible and impermissible kinds of contraception
regulation, for example, by reasoning that prohibiting some kinds of
contraception does not impose an undue burden as long as other kinds are
available. Indeed, some commentators distinguish between different kinds
of contraception by focusing on whether conception, rather than
implantation, is prevented,158 claiming that where the latter is achieved the
method is not appropriately classified as a form of contraception.159
Certainly, such a position would create an undue burden on someone
who had been raped,160 because the lack of access to a morning-after pill
might condemn her to becoming pregnant by her rapist.161 But the Court
might account for that exception by saying that the Constitution only
requires access to a morning-after pill when there has been a claim of
forced relations, which would severely limit access to the particular form of
contraception.162

156. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007).
157. Cf. Robert Streiffer, Chimeras, Moral Status, and Public Policy: Implications of the
Abortion Debate for Public Policy on Human/Nonhuman Chimera Research, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 238, 242 (2010) (discussing a writer who “uses ‘fetus’ to refer to the conceptus at all
stages of prenatal development”).
158. See Lynne Marie Kohm, From Eisenstadt to Plan B: A Discussion of Conscientious
Objections to Emergency Contraception, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 787, 794 (2007) (“If the
drug [in the morning-after pill] fails to inhibit ovulation or fertilization and instead inhibits
implantation of an embryo, it is disingenuous to call the morning-after pill ‘emergency
contraception,’ as the conception of human life has already occurred.”).
159. See id.; see also Jason M. Horst, The Meaning of “Life”: The Morning-After Pill,
The Question of When Life Begins, and Judicial Review, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 205, 214
(2007) (“[A]pplying or imposing restrictions such as parental notification or consent
requirements to the morning-after pill may be unconstitutional under contraception doctrine
but constitutional under abortion doctrine.”).
160. See Katherine D. Spitz, Note, Sex, Drugs, and Federalism’s Role: Regulation of the
Morning After Pill on Public College and University Campuses, 33 J.C. & U.L. 191, 223
(2006) (“One of the primary applications for the morning after pill for women of all age
groups is its use to prevent unwanted pregnancies following rape.”).
161. See Kara N. Bitar, Note, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 275, 279 (2012) (“[I]t is important to understand rape in the United States. . . .
[P]regnancies do result from rape . . . .”).
162. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992) (“The
underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions
in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those
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Will the Court apply an undue burden test to contraception rights or,
perhaps, hold that the Fourteenth Amendment neither prohibits nor requires
access to contraception?163 The answer is unclear, but privacy jurisprudence
as a general matter does not appear especially stable right now. Still, the
federal courts seem to view the Constitution as affording more protection to
contraception rights than abortion rights,164 and it may well be that the
Court will not permit States to limit access to contraception or early-stage
abortions simply by passing a personhood amendment.165 Further limitation
of constitutional rights to contraception and abortion of pre-viable fetuses
by the Court will likely depend upon whether the composition of the Court
changes and how the developing jurisprudence is interpreted in the next
several abortion cases. In any event, it is likely that personhood
amendments will have implications for assisted reproductive technologies.
III. Personhood Amendments and Assisted Reproductive Technology
To understand some of the possible implications that the adoption of
personhood amendments would have for assisted reproductive technology
(ART), it is helpful to consider some of the issues arising in that context.
One issue that has arisen in several jurisdictions involves the disposition of
frozen embryos upon divorce where the parties cannot agree on the method
of disposition.166 The way that this issue and others would likely be

rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is
the result of rape or incest.”).
163. Cf. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution contains no right to abortion. It is not to be found in the
longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be logically deduced from the text of the
Constitution . . . .”). Justice Scalia might make the same claim about contraception. The
Casey plurality noted that “in some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same
character as the decision to use contraception.” 505 U.S. at 852.
164. See Horst, supra note 159, at 215 (“[C]ourts scrutinize limitations on rights to use
and access to contraception to a greater degree than they do abortion rights.”); Annemarie
Brennan, Note, Is All Privacy Created Equal?, 20 VT. L. REV. 815, 831 (1996) (“The
Supreme Court appears to accept the idea that contraception and abortion are logically and
legally separate . . . .”).
165. Dunaway, supra note 114, at 357 (“Even if the state chose to view the prescription
and ingestion of oral contraceptives as a form of abortion (which is unlikely for a variety of
reasons), abortion would continue to be legal at this early stage by virtue of other state laws
and by Supreme Court precedent.”).
166. See A.Z. v. B.Z, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J.
2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992).
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resolved might change greatly in a state that had adopted a personhood
amendment.
A. Frozen Embryo Disposition
The developing jurisprudence with respect to the right to transfer or
dispose of frozen embryos has been predicated upon the embryo not being a
person.167 While the rationales have differed, courts have generally refused
to award embryos to those who wished to use them when one of the
progenitors objected to their use.168 However, that jurisprudence would
likely change dramatically in a state where personhood began at
conception.
In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court was asked to decide
which of the two divorcing progenitors, Junior Davis or Mary Sue Davis,
would be awarded custody of their remaining frozen embryos.169 Initially,
Mary Sue had wanted the embryos for her own use,170 although she later
decided that she wanted to donate them to a childless couple.171
When initially signing up for the embryo freezing program, the Davises
failed to specify what should be done with any unused embryos.172
Tennessee did not have any existing law governing what should be done in
167. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 (“[N]or are the pre-zygotes recognized as ‘persons’ for
constitutional purposes.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973))); Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 597 (“We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or
‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life.”).
168. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003) (“A better
principle to apply, we think, is the requirement of contemporaneous mutual consent. Under
that model, no transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos can occur without the
signed authorization of both donors. If a stalemate results, the status quo would be
maintained.”); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057-58 (“[W]e would not enforce an agreement that
would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will.”).
169. 842 S.W.2d at 589 (“The parties were able to agree upon all terms of dissolution,
except one: who was to have ‘custody’ of the seven ‘frozen embryos’ stored in a Knoxville
fertility clinic that had attempted to assist the Davises in achieving a much-wanted
pregnancy during a happier period in their relationship.”).
170. Id. (“Mary Sue Davis originally asked for control of the ‘frozen embryos’ with the
intent to have them transferred to her own uterus, in a post-divorce effort to become
pregnant.”).
171. Id. at 590 (“She no longer wishes to utilize the ‘frozen embryos’ herself, but wants
authority to donate them to a childless couple.”).
172. Id. (“When the Davises signed up for the [in vitro fertilization] program at the
Knoxville clinic, they did not execute a written agreement specifying what disposition
should be made of any unused embryos that might result from the cryopreservation
process.”).
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the event of a disagreement about the disposition of embryos.173 The Davis
court focused on whether embryos should be considered persons or
property,174 and cited with approval the intermediate court’s point that the
state’s wrongful death statute did not apply to a viable fetus not born
alive.175 The Tennessee Supreme Court also noted that the fetus was not a
person for purposes of federal law.176
The trial court found that preembryos were legal persons, a holding that
the Tennessee Supreme Court feared would have dire implications for in
vitro fertilization (IVF) programs.177 The court stated, “Such a decision
would doubtless have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state
of Tennessee.”178 The court did not explore why such a holding would have
such an effect. For example, the court noted that Louisiana precluded the
destruction of embryos, directing instead that such embryos should be put
up for adoption,179 but Louisiana nonetheless has fertility clinics.180
Presumably, the Tennessee court had more in mind than merely that
recognition of fetal personhood would mean that the State would now
require embryo donation rather than embryo destruction.181
Further, the Davis court refused to classify the embryos as either persons
or property, but instead as “occupy[ing] an interim category that entitles
them to special respect.”182 The court explained that an agreement
concerning the disposition of embryos “should be presumed valid and
should be enforced as between the progenitors.”183 Although such an
agreement could subsequently be modified by the parties, the court

173. Id. (“Moreover, there was at that time no Tennessee statute governing such
disposition, nor has one been enacted in the meantime.”).
174. Id. at 594 (“One of the fundamental issues the inquiry poses is whether the
preembryos in this case should be considered ‘persons’ or ‘property’ in the contemplation of
the law.”).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 595.
177. Id. (“Left undisturbed, the trial court’s ruling would have afforded preembryos the
legal status of ‘persons’ and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate from
those of their progenitors.”).
178. Id.
179. See id. at 590 n.1.
180. See About the Doctors, FERTILITY INST., http://www.fertilityinstitute.com/html/
doctors.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
181. See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text (discussing why the court might have
made that assessment).
182. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
183. Id.
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explained that the original agreement should be enforced absent such a
modification.184
In addition, the Davis court discussed the State’s interests in potential
human life represented by the embryos, reasoning that “if the state’s
interests do not become sufficiently compelling in the abortion context until
the end of the first trimester, after very significant developmental stages
have passed, then surely there is no state interest in these pre-embryos
which could suffice to overcome the interests of the gamete-providers.”185
However, the court’s argument is incomplete. While the State might not
have sufficiently important interests to justify overriding a woman’s
decision to abort her pre-viable fetus, that would not mean that the State did
not have significant interests at issue when personal autonomy rights did
not hang in the balance.
The Davis court explained that “the state’s interest in the potential life of
these preembryos is not sufficient to justify any infringement upon the
freedom of these individuals to make their own decisions.”186 Because the
State’s interests were not sufficiently weighty and “an interest in avoiding
genetic parenthood can be significant enough to trigger the protections
afforded to all other aspects of parenthood,”187 the court concluded “that
Mary Sue Davis’s interest in donation is not as significant as the interest
Junior Davis has in avoiding parenthood.”188 It was easier for the court to
weigh Junior’s interests more heavily than Mary Sue’s because she wanted
to donate the embryos whereas Junior would have had special difficulties as
a result of his own personal history if the embryos had been implanted and
resulted in a live birth.189 Deciding who should have custody of the
embryos would have been much more difficult if Mary Sue wanted to use
the embryos herself and was no longer able to produce eggs.190

184. Id. (“But, in the absence of such agreed modification, we conclude that their prior
agreements should be considered binding.”).
185. Id. at 602.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 603.
188. Id. at 604.
189. See id. (“In light of his boyhood experiences, Junior Davis is vehemently opposed to
fathering a child that would not live with both parents. . . . Likewise, he is opposed to
donation because the recipient couple might divorce, leaving the child (which he definitely
would consider his own) in a single-parent setting.”).
190. Id. (“The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the
preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable
means.”).
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An important element in the Davis analysis involved the lack of an
agreement between the Davises about what would be done with the
embryos in the event of divorce. In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of
Appeals addressed the enforceability of an agreement that frozen embryos
would be donated for research purposes upon a divorce.191 The difficulty for
the now-divorced Maureen Kass was that the frozen pre-embryos
represented “her only chance for genetic motherhood.”192
Rejecting that the pre-zygotes were “recognized as ‘persons’ for
constitutional purposes,”193 the Kass court followed the Davis court’s lead
in holding that “[a]greements between progenitors, or gamete donors,
regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed
valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.”194 When
using this model, the pressing question involves determining whether the
parties’ intent was clearly expressed.195 The Kass court reasoned that as
long as the intentions of the parties could be determined, the agreement
should be enforced.196
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a much different
approach in A.Z. v. B.Z.197 The A.Z. court focused on whether to uphold an
injunction preventing B.Z., the former wife of A.Z., from making use of
191. 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he parties agreed at the time they embarked
on the effort that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF
program for approved research purposes.”).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 179.
194. Id. at 180.
195. Id. (“The central issue is whether the consents clearly express the parties’ intent
regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present circumstances.”).
196. Id. at 182 (“These parties having clearly manifested their intention, the law will
honor it.”). A Texas intermediate appellate court also endorsed a contract model for handling
disputes about the disposition of frozen embryos. See Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 50
(Tex. App. 2006) (“[A]llowing the parties voluntarily to decide the disposition of frozen
embryos in advance of cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind, jointly
expressed, best serves the existing public policy of this State and the interests of the
parties. . . . [A]n embryo agreement that satisfies these criteria does not violate the public
policy of the State of Texas.”); see also Vitakis v. Valchine, 987 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (enforcing a settlement agreement specifying that wife would turn over
“frozen embryos to the husband so that he could dispose of them”); Karmasu v. Karmasu,
2009-OHIO-5252, No. 2008 CA 00231, 2009 WL 3155062, ¶ 38 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
2009) (“[T]he trial court did not err in holding that the ‘custody’ of the frozen embryos was
controlled by the contract between the parties and Reproductive Gynecology.”); Dahl v.
Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (“[C]ourts should give effect to agreements
showing the parties’ intent for the disposition of frozen embryos . . . .”).
197. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
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frozen embryos they created.198 In the case, there was a writing expressly
stating that if A.Z. and B.Z. “[s]hould become separated, [they] both
agree[d] to have the embryo(s) . . . return[ed] to [the] wife for implant.”199
However, the court refused to enforce that provision, at least in part,
because the form did “not state, and the record [did] not indicate, that the
husband and wife intended the consent form to act as a binding agreement
between them should they later disagree as to the disposition.”200 Instead,
the court interpreted the form as constituting an agreement between the
clinic and the couple as a unit.201
Such an interpretation was somewhat surprising.202 The agreement did
not state that the embryos should be returned to the couple, but to the wife
in particular.203 The husband agreeing to the clinic returning the embryos to
the wife would at least suggest that the husband and wife had reached an
agreement about the disposition of the embryos. If, for example, the clinic
had intentionally violated the agreement by giving the embryos to the
husband rather than the wife, the clinic might be subject to damages,204
whereas the clinic would presumably not have been potentially liable for
following the terms of the contract by transferring the embryos to the
wife.205
198. Id. at 1052 (“B.Z., the former wife (wife) of A.Z. (husband), appeals from a
judgment of the Probate and Family Court that included, inter alia, a permanent injunction in
favor of the husband, prohibiting the wife ‘from utilizing’ the frozen preembryos held in
cryopreservation at the clinic.” (footnotes omitted)).
199. Id. at 1054 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 1056.
201. Id. (“[I]t was intended only to define the donors’ relationship as a unit with the
clinic.”).
202. See Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business):
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1184-85
(2009) (“[I]t is utterly implausible to interpret the language at issue as merely intended to
govern the relationship between the clinic and the donors as a unit, since it described the
then-current intention to give the ex-wife the embryos for her own use should the couple
later separate.”).
203. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054.
204. Cf. Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 157 (Ct. App.
2008) (“Based on our review of the complaints, we conclude the patients’ claims for fraud,
conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress related to wrongful intentional
conduct, not mere negligence. The allegations of stealing and then selling a person’s genetic
material for financial gain is an intentional act of egregious abuse against a particularly
vulnerable and trusting victim.”).
205. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Washington Supreme
Court’s language noting that the clinic would not have been liable for destroying the frozen
embryos, given the agreement between the clinic and the commissioning parties).
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The A.Z. court’s discussion was surprising in other ways as well. For
example, the court noted that the form lacked a “duration provision.”206
However, because couples making use of frozen embryos do not have great
success rates in achieving live births,207 it is not unusual for couples to
continue trying to achieve a live birth for years.208 Thus, while the lack of a
duration provision might have been a more persuasive argument under a
different set of facts, it was not particularly convincing here.209
Finally, the clinic form employed the term “separated.”210 The A.Z. court
reasoned:
Because this dispute arose in the context of a divorce, we cannot
conclude that the consent form was intended to govern in these
circumstances. Separation and divorce have distinct legal
meanings. Legal changes occur by operation of law when a
couple divorces that do not occur when a couple separates.211
But the A.Z. court’s method of construing the agreement was not
particularly convincing—one would neither expect nor require a couple to
206. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056. A duration provision would have specified the length of
time that the provision would have been in effect. For example, the court noted that “[t]he
wife sought to enforce this particular form four years after it was signed by the husband in
significantly changed circumstances and over the husband’s objection.” Id. at 1056-57. The
court seemed unconvinced that the parties had intended that the provision would still apply
four years after it had been signed. See id. at 1057.
207. See David Orentlicher, Discrimination Out of Dismissiveness: The Example of
Infertility, 85 IND. L.J. 143, 182 n.326 (2010) (discussing the lower success rate with frozen
embryos than with fresh embryos).
208. Cf. Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 1203,
1232-33 (2009) (“Keeping in mind that on average 2.5 to 2.9 embryos are transferred per
cycle, the actual success rate per unfrozen embryo is as low as eleven percent. If one takes
into account that around thirty percent of embryos do not survive the thawing process, then
the success rate per frozen embryo plummets to just under eight percent.” (footnotes
omitted)).
209. See Strasser, supra note 202, at 1185 (“Yet, it is not uncommon for couples to be
deciding what to do with frozen embryos four years after their creation, so the lack of a
duration provision should not have militated against enforcement in this particular case,
given when that enforcement was sought.” (footnote omitted)). In contrast, a different case
would be presented if enforcement had been sought decades later. Cf. Carl H. Coleman,
Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to
Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 102 (1999) (“The difficulty of predicting
one’s future feelings about cryopreserved embryos is compounded by the fact that
disposition decisions may not be implemented for decades after the embryos are created.”).
210. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057.
211. Id. (footnote omitted).
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distinguish between separation and divorce in this context unless, for
example, they had sought legal counsel.
The A.Z. decision not to enforce the agreement was not driven by the
alleged defects in the consent forms.212 The court instead made clear that
even if the agreement had been clear and unambiguous, it still would not
have been enforced over A.Z.’s objection213 because “forced procreation is
not an area amenable to judicial enforcement.”214 The court cautioned that
“prior agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or
parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals who subsequently
reconsider their decisions.”215 Implicit within such an analysis is that an
individual should be free to change his or her mind before the agreement
has been effectuated. However, once one has become a parent or, perhaps,
has assured someone else that one will share in the parenting
responsibilities, one should not be permitted to change one’s mind and
avoid the obligations that one had voluntarily accepted.216
In J.B. v. M.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court cited A.Z. with
approval.217 At issue in J.B. was a disagreement about the disposition of
frozen embryos upon divorce.218 Here, there was conflicting testimony
about the parties’ common understanding when they had begun the IVF
program.219 J.B. testified that she intended to use the embryos only within
her marriage, and that she now wanted them to be discarded.220 In contrast,
M.B. stated that the couple agreed that the embryos would either be used by
J.B. or, instead, be donated to an infertile couple.221

212. See id.
213. Id. (“[E]ven had the husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement
between themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we would not
enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her
will.”).
214. Id. at 1058.
215. Id. at 1059.
216. Cf. In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. App. 2003) (noting that Texas law
“codified paternity by estoppel, allowing a court to deny a motion for genetic testing if the
conduct of the mother or the presumed father estops that party from denying parentage”).
217. 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001).
218. Id. at 710.
219. Id.
220. Id. (“J.B. filed a motion for summary judgment on the preembryo issue in April
1998 alleging, in a certification filed with the motion, that she had intended to use the
preembryos solely within her marriage to M.B.”).
221. Id. (“M.B., in a cross-motion filed in July 1998, described his understanding very
differently. He certified that he and J.B. had agreed prior to undergoing the in vitro
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The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the need to determine the actual
intent of the parties at the time they began the IVF process.222 The court
reasoned: “Assuming that it would be possible to enter into a valid
agreement at that time irrevocably deciding the disposition of preembryos
in circumstances such as we have here, a formal, unambiguous
memorialization of the parties’ intentions would be required to confirm
their joint determination.”223 However, the court did not end its analysis
there. The court explained, “M.B.’s right to procreate is not lost if he is
denied an opportunity to use or donate the preembryos. M.B. is already a
father and is able to become a father to additional children, whether through
natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization.”224 But the effect on J.B.
would allegedly be much different. “J.B.’s right not to procreate may be
lost through attempted use or through donation of the preembryos.
Implantation, if successful, would result in the birth of her biological child
and could have life-long emotional and psychological repercussions.”225
Yet, the J.B. court was somewhat selective in the harms that it wished to
discuss. Suppose, for example, that M.B. viewed the destruction of an
embryo as the equivalent of the loss of a child, a potential harm to him not
even considered by the court. Courts have been willing to award damages
for pain and suffering for the loss of a fetus,226 so one might have expected
the New Jersey court to have included more considerations in its balancing.
Indeed, M.B. asserted religious convictions regarding the preservation of
the preembryos, which provided additional interests to be weighed.227
It might be thought that the J.B. court adopted the approach employed in
Davis to balance the parties’ interests in those cases where there was no
express agreement to control the disposition of the embryos.228 But such a
view would be incorrect. The New Jersey Supreme Court made clear that
even if there had been an express written agreement, such an agreement
would not have been enforceable against the wishes of someone who had
changed his or her mind.229 According to the court, “[T]he better rule, and
fertilization procedure that any unused preembryos would not be destroyed, but would be
used by his wife or donated to infertile couples.”).
222. Id. at 714.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 717.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pastoriza, 810 N.W.2d 42, 54 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010)
(upholding “damages for emotional distress, mental anguish, and grief and sorrow”).
227. J.B., 783 A.2d at 712.
228. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
229. J.B., 783 A.2d at 719.
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the one we adopt, is to enforce agreements entered into at the time in vitro
fertilization is begun, subject to the right of either party to change his or her
mind about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
preembryos.”230
The J.B. court clearly viewed its ruling as preventing an individual from
being forced to become a parent against his or her will.231 However, a
separate question was raised by the court’s suggestion that an individual
could change his or her mind about the use or destruction of the embryos,
namely, whether an individual could block the destruction of the embryos
by withholding his or her consent. Thus, the court did not explain whether it
was offering the would-be parent a method by which he or she could
maintain the status quo (continuing to neither be a parent nor have embryos
destroyed) by keeping the embryos frozen.
The J.B. court also noted that the intermediate appellate court had
ordered the embryos to be destroyed,232 but that at oral argument J.B.
manifested her willingness for the embryos to remain frozen if M.B. were
willing to pay the costs associated with their continued preservation.233 The
court was amenable to that arrangement if M.B. agreed to those terms.234
One cannot tell, however, whether M.B. could have blocked the destruction
of the embryos as a matter of right (as long as he was willing to pay the
costs of continued cryopreservation) or whether, instead, this possibility
was presented only because of J.B.’s willingness to permit continued
cryopreservation of the embryos.
The Washington Supreme Court employed yet another approach to
analyze these issues in Litowitz v. Litowitz.235 Becky and David Litowitz
could not agree about what to do with the remaining frozen embryos at the
time of their divorce.236 Becky was unable to produce eggs or carry a child

230. Id.
231. Id. (“[O]rdinarily the party choosing not to become a biological parent will
prevail.”).
232. Id. at 720 (“Under the judgment of the Appellate Division, the seven remaining
preembryos are to be destroyed.”).
233. Id. (“It was represented to us at oral argument, however, that J.B. does not object to
their continued storage if M.B. wishes to pay any fees associated with that storage.”).
234. Id. (“M.B. must inform the trial court forthwith whether he will do so; otherwise,
the preembryos are to be destroyed.”).
235. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
236. Id. at 264.
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to term and wanted the embryos implanted in a surrogate.237 In contrast,
David wanted them donated to another couple.238
The trial court awarded the embryos to David using a “best interests of
the child” standard.239 That court took into consideration that Becky would
be a single, elderly mother if implantation in a surrogate led to a live
birth.240 It was not clear whether Becky’s lack of a genetic connection to the
child (donor eggs had been used) secretly played any role in the analysis.241
The Washington Supreme Court explained that “the egg donor contract
[gave] her and Respondent equal rights to the eggs even though she [was]
not a progenitor.”242 However, the court reasoned that “the egg donor
contract [did] not relate to the preembryos which resulted from subsequent
sperm fertilization of the eggs.”243 Perhaps that is so, but the question
remained whether Becky had a cognizable interest in the preembryos. If
not, then one would have expected David’s wishes to be honored because
his interest in the preembryos was not merely based on rights gained
through contract.
Suppose that the Litowitz court had said that Becky lacked a cognizable
interest in the preembryos because, after all, she had “no biological
connection to the preembryos and [was] not a progenitor.”244 It would not
be difficult to imagine other kinds of cases where parental rights would be
contested—one of the parties could claim that the other party did not have
an interest in the embryos or, perhaps, in the child, because the latter party
had no biological connection to those embryos or to that child.245 In any
event, it is clear that the court did not deny that Becky had an interest in the
disposition of the embryos, if only because of the court’s refusal to simply
award them to David.246 Indeed, the court’s ruling was not in accord with
the wishes of either David or Becky.247
237. Id. at 262, 264.
238. Id. at 264.
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting the trial court’s order and emphasizing that “both parties here are old
enough to be the grandparents of any child, and that is not an ideal circumstance”).
241. See id. at 262-63 (noting that an “egg donor” had been used).
242. Id. at 267.
243. Id. at 268.
244. Id. at 267.
245. See, e.g., In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005) (discussing an ex-partner who
claimed that his ex-partner was not a parent of the children she carried to term because she
was not genetically related to them).
246. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 271.
247. Id.
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The Litowitz court also noted that the original contract between the
Litowitzes and the fertility center had specified that after five years the
frozen embryos would be “thawed but not allowed to undergo further
development . . . . until such time as [that option selection was] changed, in
writing, by [the Litowitzes’] joint direction.”248 Because more than five
years had elapsed since the contract was signed and before the first
implantation had taken place, the Washington Supreme Court noted that the
embryos might already have been destroyed.249 If the embryos were still in
existence, the court directed that the intention under the original contract be
carried out,250 which presumably meant that the embryos would be
destroyed, contrary to the wishes of both parties.251
In In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted the
approach suggested by the New Jersey Supreme Court in J.B.,252 namely,
that the status quo would be maintained in cases in which the parties could
not agree.253 Tamera and Trip Witten were divorcing, and they could not
agree about the disposition of the embryos that had been created during the
marriage.254
Tamera wished to have them implanted either in her or in a surrogate.255
“She testified that upon a successful pregnancy she would afford Trip the
opportunity to exercise parental rights or to have his rights terminated,”
whichever he preferred.256 She opposed donation or destruction of the

248. Id. at 264 (emphasis and citation omitted).
249. Id. at 268-69 (“[T]he cryopreservation contract was signed by the Litowitzes on
March 25, 1996. More than five years have passed since that date. The probable date of
implantation of the three preembryos actually used was April 20, 1996. More than five years
have passed since that date.”).
250. Id. at 269 (“If the two preembryos still exist, they would be a proper subject for
consideration by the court under the cryopreservation contract.”).
251. Id. at 274 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (“But the majority’s disposition apparently calls
for the destruction of unborn human life even when, or if, both contracting parties agreed the
preembryos should be brought to fruition as a living child reserving their disagreement over
custody for judicial determination.”).
252. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying test (discussing one possible
interpretation of J.B.).
253. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003).
254. See id. at 772-73.
255. Id. at 772 (“Tamera asked that she be awarded ‘custody’ of the embryos. She
wanted to have the embryos implanted in her or a surrogate mother in an effort to bear a
genetically linked child.”).
256. Id. at 772-73.
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embryos.257 While Trip opposed destruction or use of the embryos by his
ex-wife, he did not oppose the embryos being donated to another couple.258
One of the first legal issues addressed by the court was whether the fetus
was a person for purposes of state law.259 The court noted some
inconsistency in the case law.260 In one case, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that a fetus not born alive was not a person,261 but in a different case
allowed recovery for the death of a fetus that was not born alive, reasoning
that an unborn fetus should count as a deceased child. 262
The Witten court then set about deciding whether the best interest test
could be used in the context of deciding who should be awarded frozen
embryos.263 The court found such principles inapplicable because “it would
be premature to consider which parent can most effectively raise the child
when the ‘child’ is still frozen in a storage facility.”264
While recognizing that “Iowa statutes clearly impose responsibilities on
parents for the support and safekeeping of their children,” the Iowa court
reasoned that those laws “do not contemplate the complex issues
surrounding the disposition and use of frozen human embryos.”265 The
court interpreted the state’s public policy to relate to “the State’s concern
for the physical, emotional, and psychological well being of children who
have been born, not fertilized eggs that have not even resulted in a
pregnancy.”266
The Iowa court seemed to accept the judgment of sister courts that there
was “no public policy that requires the use of the frozen embryos over one
party’s objection.”267 Further, the court was sympathetic to the approach
offered by the Massachusetts and New Jersey courts, reasoning that “it
would be against the public policy of this state to enforce a prior agreement
between the parties in this highly personal area of reproductive choice when
one of the parties has changed his or her mind concerning the disposition or

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
1971)).
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 774.
Id.
See id. at 775 (discussing McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa
See id. (discussing Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Iowa 1983)).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Id.
Id.
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use of the embryos.”268 Indeed, the court, citing J.B., adopted the
contemporaneous consent model, holding that “agreements entered into at
the time in vitro fertilization is commenced are enforceable and binding on
the parties, ‘subject to the right of either party to change his or her mind
about disposition up to the point of use or destruction of any stored
embryo.’”269 The court applied the contemporaneous consent model not
only to the implantation of embryos, but also to their destruction.270 The
court explained that “no transfer, release, disposition, or use of the embryos
can occur without the signed authorization of both donors.”271 The court
understood that where one party wanted to use the embryos and the other
party wanted to destroy them, there might well be a “stalemate.”272 In that
event, “the embryos [would be] stored indefinitely unless both parties
[could] agree,” and “any expense associated with maintaining the status quo
should . . . be borne by the person opposing destruction.”273
The Witten court was correct that the best interests test is not readily
applied in the frozen embryos context if the question involves which of two
would-be parents should be awarded frozen embryos. After all, there might
not be any history to help determine which parent having custody would
best promote the interests of the child. But that point, while accurate, hardly
supports the contemporaneous consent model—it is difficult to understand
why an embryo’s interests are promoted by being in perpetual frozen limbo
unless the alternative is destruction.
B. Frozen Embryos and Personhood
Many of the courts addressing the disposition of frozen embryos have
expressly noted that the embryos were not persons.274 This played an
analytical role in at least two distinct ways. First, courts deciding who
should be awarded frozen embryos sometimes weigh the right to become a
parent against the right to not become a parent.275 But if the fetus is a
person from the moment of conception, then those who have created
embryos have already become parents (or, at least, have already created
persons). Second, when deciding whether enforcing an agreement to
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 781.
Id. at 782 (quoting J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001)).
Id. at 783.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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destroy frozen embryos violates public policy, courts assumed that
enforcement would not result in the death of persons.276 In a state with a
personhood amendment, enforcement of such a contract would not only
destroy persons and thus violate public policy, but might also result in the
imposition of criminal sanctions.277
That personhood amendments would have implications for criminal law
should not be surprising. To see this, one need only consider the increasing
tendency in the states to impose criminal or civil sanctions against those
who cause the injury or death of a fetus, even when the fetus is not
considered a person.278 In these cases, abortion rights are not relevant
because the pregnant mother plans to carry the fetus to term.279 However,
such statutes are also applied to pregnant women who expose the fetuses in
utero to prohibited drugs.280 For example, in State v. McKnight, South
Carolina convicted a woman of homicide by child abuse for exposing her
fetus in utero to cocaine.281
Personhood amendments would expand the universe of beings whose
deaths might result in criminal sanctions. If frozen embryos are persons,
then an individual who destroys them intentionally or recklessly would risk

276. See discussion supra Part III.A.
277. A separate issue is whether criminal laws could be applied retroactively to punish
those who destroyed embryos prior to the passage of a personhood amendment. See
Dunaway, supra note 114, at 358 (“[A] personhood bill such as the model discussed herein
would not and could not criminalize that practice. This is because due process requirements
preclude the criminal prosecution of any individual without clear, specific guidance as to
what behavior is proscribed. This bill would not meet those standards with regard to conduct
that was legal prior to its passage . . . .”).
278. See Crist, supra note 114, at 856.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Boie, 70 M.J. 585 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing
a husband who was charged with causing the death of his unborn child by secretly placing
drugs in his wife’s food, where she wanted to carry the fetus to term); see also Crist, supra
note 114, at 854 (“[I]t is entirely logical for a state to punish the same act (termination of a
pregnancy) differently in different circumstances. Abortion by the mother is simply not the
same as an unprovoked assault on the fetus by a third party.”).
280. See, e.g., Ankrom v. State, CR-09-1148, 2011 WL 3781258 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug.
26, 2011) (upholding conviction of a woman who exposed her fetus to cocaine in utero);
Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (woman charged with feticide for
ingesting rat poison when she was thirty-three weeks pregnant); cf. Nelson, supra note 20, at
186 (“[A] pregnant woman could face criminal prosecution for child endangerment . . . if her
prenatal human were a constitutional person because the State is obligated to protect the
lives and health of the unborn to the same extent it protects the lives of born children.”).
281. 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003).
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the imposition of criminal sanctions.282 This might even mean that an
individual who negligently caused the destruction of frozen embryos could
be subject to criminal penalties.283 It was perhaps the potential for civil and
criminal liability that the Davis court feared would result in the closing of
IVF programs.284
Certainly, it is fair to suggest that whether or not embryos are treated as
persons, the mishandling of such embryos creates the potential for
liability.285 Yet, the kinds of potential civil and criminal liability would
greatly increase if the recognition of personhood from the moment of
conception were accorded.286
Some states permit wrongful death actions for fetuses.287 For example,
Louisiana recognizes wrongful death actions for fetuses,288 but does not
282. Cf. Nelson, supra note 20, at 203 (“Twenty-five states have statutes which make the
unborn at any stage of development victims of criminal homicide . . . .”).
283. See Inst. for Women’s Health, P.L.L.C. v. Imad, No. 04-05-00555-CV, 2006 WL
334013, at *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 15, 2006) (“[A]n embryologist employed by Women’s Health
dropped a tray of nine fertilized eggs, destroying eight of those eggs. . . . [T]he Imads
subsequently filed suit against Women’s Health asserting theories of negligence, bailment
and wrongful death.”). If negligence could be proven and the fertilized eggs were considered
persons, the embryologist presumably might have been subject to criminal sanction.
284. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
285. For example, a couple sued a fertility clinic for destroying eight of the nine fertilized
eggs they had created. See Imad, 2006 WL 334013, at *1; see also Jeter v. Mayo Clinic
Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“The Jeters sued Mayo for the alleged
negligent destruction or loss of five of the Jeters’ frozen human pre-implantation embryos or
pre-embryos, which Mayo agreed to cryopreserve and store.” (footnote omitted)); UnruhHaxton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 157 (Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he
patients’ claims for fraud, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress related
to wrongful intentional conduct, not mere negligence. The allegations of stealing and then
selling a person’s genetic material for financial gain is an intentional act of egregious abuse
against a particularly vulnerable and trusting victim.”). Additionally, in Frisina v. Women &
Infants Hosp. of R.I., the plaintiffs “brought suit against the Hospital for the loss or
destruction of their embryos,” asserting “three theories of recovery: medical malpractice,
bailment, and breach of contract.” Nos. CIV.A. 95-4037, 95-4469, 95-5827, 2002 WL
1288784, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002).
286. For example, the Jeter court held that “absent legislative action expanding the
wrongful death statutes, as a matter of law, a cryopreserved, three-day old fertilized human
egg is not a ‘person’ for purposes of that statute.” 121 P.3d at 1259.
287. See Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 735 (Ala. 2012) (“Alabama’s wrongful-death
statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child, even when
the child dies before reaching viability.”); Johnson v. Pastoriza, 818 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Mich.
2012) (discussing a Michigan law that “imposes liability for wrongful or negligent acts
against a pregnant woman that result in the pregnant woman’s miscarriage or stillbirth or
‘physical injury’ to the fetus”); Pino v. United States, 2008 OK 26, ¶ 24, 183 P.3d 1001,
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thereby accord fetuses legal personhood as a general matter.289 Were
personhood recognized from the moment of conception, wrongful death
actions might be brought on behalf of frozen embryos.290
Courts might also focus on whether the frozen embryo, if implanted,
would have led to a live birth.291 However, this focus would not be to
determine whether a person would have existed, because that would have
already been established by the personhood amendment.292 Rather, such a
focus might be helpful in determining which damages would be more than
merely speculative.293 Indeed, a separate issue is whether it would even be
possible as a matter of law to prove damages in such cases.294
1006 (“Oklahoma’s wrongful death statute, [12 OKLA. STAT. § 1053], afforded a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a nonviable, stillborn fetus.”).
288. Wartelle v. Women’s & Children’s Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 780-81 (La. 1997)
(“Article 26 provides: An unborn child shall be considered as a natural child for whatever
relates to its interests from the moment of conception. If the child is born dead, it shall be
considered never to have existed as a person, except for purposes of actions resulting from
its wrongful death.”) (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (1987)).
289. See id. at 784 (“[I]t is indisputable that La. Civ. Code art. 26 creates exceptions to
the general rule that a stillborn fetus has no legal personality. It is a well settled rule of
statutory construction that exceptions to a general rule are narrowly construed.” (citing State
ex rel Murtagh v. Dep’t of City Civil Serv., 42 So. 2d 65 (La. 1949))).
290. Dunaway, supra note 114, at 347 (“One immediate effect of a personhood law
would be the creation of a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child in a
state that does not already recognize this cause of action. Where left to interpretation, courts
generally construe state wrongful death statutes to provide no cause of action for a stillborn
child, even where the death results from the tortious act of a third party.”).
291. See Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1262 (“Unlike a viable fetus, many variables affect whether a
fertilized egg outside the womb will eventually result in the birth of a child. This makes it
speculative at best to conclude that ‘but for the injury’ to the fertilized egg a child would
have been born and therefore entitled to bring suit for the injury.” (citation omitted)).
292. Cf. Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1993) (“[W]e are reaffirming the
unremarkable proposition that an infant born alive is, without qualification, a person. Since
live birth has always been and should remain a clear line of demarcation, an action for
wrongful death and survival can be maintained on behalf of the Hudak triplets.”).
293. See Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ky. 1970) (“Lack of proof of the decedent
infant Rice’s power will not preclude recovery for the wrongful, negligent destruction of the
infant’s power to earn money. To require such proof would be to deny damages in the
instant case, as well as in all similar wrongful, negligent death cases involving infants. There
is an inference that the child would have had some earning power, and in this lies the basis
for recovery.” (citing City of Louisville v. Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94. (Ky. 1968);
Heskamp v. Bradshaw’s Adm’r, 172 S.W.2d 447 (Ky. 1943))). But see DiDonato v.
Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494 (N.C. 1987) (“We also hold that damages normally
recovered under [the North Carolina statute]—loss of services, companionship, advice and
the like—will not be available in an action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. The
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The personhood of embryos would have other legal implications as well.
Consider Cwik v. Cwik, in which the ex-husband claimed that enforcing the
previous agreement to give the frozen embryos to his ex-wife was contrary
to public policy and “unenforceable.”295 He argued “that it was in the best
interest of the parties’ embryos that he be granted ‘custody’ because he
would hire a surrogate to give birth to the embryos.”296 The court rejected
his argument, at least in part, because “[c]ourts have not afforded frozen
embryos legally protected interests akin to persons.”297 As a result, the court
affirmed the lower court’s decision “awarding the frozen embryos in
accordance with the signed [contract].”298
Suppose that Cwik were decided in a state where frozen embryos were
considered persons. In that event, it would be difficult to justify awarding
them to an individual who opposed their implantation.
For this reason, the Witten court’s analysis was correct, but incomplete,
when it noted that the best interests test may not be particularly well-suited
to deciding frozen embryo disputes.299 The court was correct that when
progenitors argue about who should have custody, there is, of course, no
record with respect to who has exercised primary caretaking duties.300 By
the same token, one of the reasons that a custody allocation in a premarital
agreement is viewed as contrary to public policy is that one cannot tell
before the birth of a child which parent’s custody will best promote the

reasons are the same as in the case of pecuniary loss. When a child is stillborn we simply
cannot know anything about its personality and other traits relevant to what kind of
companion it might have been and what kind of services it might have provided. An award
of damages covering these kinds of losses would necessarily be based on speculation rather
than reason.” (footnote omitted)).
294. See Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (“[P]arents
and children have legally protectable interests in the life of a child from conception
onward. . . . Plaintiff’s victory to this point, however, may be largely pyrrhic. While we hold
that a wrongful death claim may be stated for a nonviable unborn child, plaintiff’s ability to
prove damages is certainly subject to question. Missouri has recognized that ‘[s]peculative
results are not a proper element of damages.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wise v.
Sands, 739 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987))).
295. 2011-OHIO-463, No. C-090843, 2011 WL 346173, ¶ 56 (Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2011).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. ¶ 64.
299. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 2003).
300. See Kurhajetz v. Fenice, No. A07-0865, 2008 WL 570821, at *4-6 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 4, 2008) (upholding custody award of child to mother, the primary caretaker).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

218

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:177

interests of that child.301 That said, the issue remains whether the embryo
will be allowed to develop into a child at all. It would seem difficult to
argue that the embryo’s best interests would be served by never being
implanted, unless there was reason to think that it would somehow be better
for the embryo never to develop into a child.302 That the best interests test is
unhelpful in determining which parent should be awarded custody of frozen
embryos does not mean that it is also unhelpful with respect to whether an
embryo’s interests would be furthered by being implanted.
In Nash v. Nash, a Washington appellate court awarded frozen embryos
upon divorce to the ex-husband, James, who wished to use them, rather
than to the ex-wife, Tina, who wanted them destroyed.303 The court noted
that James wanted to be a parent again and that he did not have reasonable
alternatives to achieve that result.304 The decision did not rely at all on the
personhood of the embryos; rather, it relied on the parties’ agreement to let
the court decide who would have custody of the remaining embryos.305 The
point is that such a result would seem even more likely had the embryos
already been deemed persons.
301. See Dysart v. Dysart, No. D196/2001, 2002 WL 31940724, at *2 (Terr. Ct. V.I. Dec.
17, 2002) (“[C]ourts have also found that the pre-marital resolution of support and custody
rights are void as against public policy.”); see also Louis Parley, Premarital Agreements in
Connecticut Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 69 CONN. B.J. 495, 512 (1995) (“For
the most part, courts have treated custody, care (including religious up-bringing) and
visitation provisions in premarital agreements as violative of public policy, being an
interference with the courts’ obligation and authority to make such determinations based on
the child’s best interests . . . .”).
302. Such a claim would be analogous to the wrongful life claim. See Nanette R. Elster,
HIV and ART: Reproductive Choices and Challenges, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
415, 424 (2003) (“A ‘wrongful life’ action is one in which the child ‘sues for damages,
claiming that he would have been better off never having lived at all . . . .’”).
303. 150 Wash. App. 1029, No. 62553-5-I, 2009 WL 1514842, at *4 (June 1, 2009) (“In
the Order Relating to Stored Embryos, the court ruled that James ‘shall have 100% control
over the embryos stored at the Reproductive Medicine Laboratory, Inc., Portland, Oregon
pursuant to the [cryopreservation agreement] signed by the parties on March 4, 2005.’ The
order also provides that ‘[n]o other person has any parental obligations or rights related to
the embryos’ and James ‘does not have to seek permission from any other person for any use
of the embryos . . . .’ Tina testified that she wanted the preembryos destroyed. James
testified that because he had ‘never loved anything in my life as much as those two little
boys,’ he ‘absolutely’ wanted more children.” (alterations in original)).
304. Id. at *4.
305. See id. at *5 (“In the mediation agreements, the parties agreed that ‘The issue of
which party shall have control over . . . the embryos stored with Oregon Reproductive
Medicine shall be determined by Judge Douglass North at a trial on October 6, 2008 or
another date set by the court.’” (alteration in original)).
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The court’s consideration of another aspect of Nash might have been
different, however. The Nash trial court ruled that Tina had no parental
rights or obligations with respect to the embryos, a ruling affirmed on
appeal.306 If the embryos were viewed as persons, a court would likely be
more reluctant to sever parental obligations of support (for example, where
the embryo was implanted and resulted in a live birth) unless doing so
could somehow be argued to be in the interest of the child.307
If embryos were viewed as persons by a State, a parent who opposed
implantation could not ask for their destruction because that would be
contrary to public policy. A more likely scenario would be that one parent
would want the embryos implanted, while the other would seek to have
them remain frozen. A court deciding between those two parents might take
several factors into account. First, one question would be whether continued
cryopreservation would be viewed as detrimental—for example, because
continued cryopreservation might decrease the chances that eventual
implantation would be successful.308 Even were there no fear of reducing
the likelihood of success of implantation, the court would have to compare
whether it would be better for the possible future child to permit an
implantation attempt or, instead, to maintain the status quo by keeping the
embryo frozen.
An additional complication might arise if, for example, the embryos
were cryopreserved in a state that considered them persons and one of the
progenitors wished to have them transferred to a different state where they
were not considered persons. York v. Jones involved a couple who wished
to have their cryopreserved pre-zygote transferred from the Jones Institute
in Norfolk, Virginia, to the Institute for Reproductive Research in Los
Angeles, California.309 When the plaintiffs entered the cryopreservation
program, they lived in New Jersey.310 However, they subsequently moved
306. Id. at *7 (“We conclude that the trial court did not exceed its authority in ruling that
Tina did not have any parental obligation or rights to the preembryos.”).
307. See In re Parental Rights as to T.M.C., 52 P.3d 934, 936 (Nev. 2002) (“The
termination of parental rights is aimed at protecting the welfare of children. However, it is
inappropriate to use termination of parental rights as a means to reward a parent by shielding
him from his obligation to provide support for his child. It would be a rare circumstance in
which the termination of parental rights would enhance, rather than deteriorate, the
relationship between a parent and his child.” (citing In re Termination of Parental Rights as
to N.J., 8 P.3d 126, 133 (Nev. 2000))).
308. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t is
unclear how long a pre-embryo can safely remain in a cryopreserved state.”).
309. 717 F. Supp. 421, 422 (E.D. Va. 1989).
310. Id. at 423.
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to California and asked the Jones Institute to transfer their remaining prezygote to California where they would again try to have a child.311 Their
request was refused.312
One of the implicated issues was how to characterize the relationship
between the plaintiffs and the clinic. The York court explained that the case
involved a bailment relationship,313 and that “[t]he essential nature of a
bailment relationship imposes on the bailee, when the purpose of the
bailment has terminated, an absolute obligation to return the subject matter
of the bailment to the bailor.”314 The Jones Institute was ordered to return
the property to the plaintiffs.315
Suppose, however, that the embryos were treated as persons. The
question would be whether relocation of the embryos to another jurisdiction
would be in the embryos’ best interests. A case like York, in which the
couple wished to attempt implantation at a facility in another state, would
presumably be decided the same way. However, a separate question would
be whether a court would permit relocation if, for example, the person
seeking the relocation was simply trying to take the embryos to a state
where they could be destroyed without violating the law.316
C. The IVF Clinic in the Personhood State
Suppose that a state with IVF clinics passed a personhood amendment.
Suppose further that the clinics remained in business, perhaps because they
would face no more civil liability than clinics in other states and they were
confident that they would not be prosecuted under criminal laws. At least
311. Id. at 423-24.
312. Id. at 424. That refusal was based on the absence of approved “guidelines
concerning the ethical, medical and legal implications of inter-institutional transfer.” Id. at
426.
313. Id. at 425 (“In the instant case, the requisite elements of a bailment relationship are
present.”).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 427; see also John Matthew Aragona, Dangerous Relations: Doctors and
Extracorporeal Embryos, the Need for New Limits to Medical Inquiry, 7 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 307, 327 (1991) (“Because the relationship between the parties had been
terminated by the Yorks, the Jones Clinic, as bailee, had an ‘absolute obligation to return the
subject matter of the bailment to the bailor.’” (quoting York, 717 F. Supp. at 425)).
316. Cf. McDonald v. Burch, 91 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“Section
452.377.9 places the burden of showing both that her request for relocation is made in good
faith and that the relocation is in the children’s best interests. Mother has not carried the
heavy burden of showing the trial court abused its wide discretion in finding that relocation
was not in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, she failed to meet one of her burdens
under § 452.377.9, so we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying her request to relocate.”).
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one issue for prospective users of the clinic would be what direction they
would give for the use of their frozen embryos.
Presumably, the State would permit couples to donate unused embryos to
someone else.317 However, a couple might not be willing to have someone
else raise children produced from their embryos. Such a couple might have
a few choices. First, if IVF clinics were located in states without
personhood amendments, the couple could make use of one of those clinics,
notwithstanding the increased costs because of extra travel. The current
jurisprudence in many states suggests that an individual would not be
forced to be a parent against his or her will, especially if the original
agreement so specified.318 Assuming that the clinic was in one of those
states, the would-be parents would not need to worry that their embryos
might be raised by someone else if their marriage ended sometime in the
future.
Second, if the couple wanted to participate in an IVF program in a state
with a personhood amendment, but was unwilling to consider donation of
their embryos, they might still harvest eggs and, perhaps, sperm. However,
rather than freeze embryos, they might instead consider freezing the eggs
(and, perhaps, the sperm) and only creating embryos as needed. Because the
frozen gametes would not themselves count as persons, the couple would
not have to worry about the possible legal and ethical difficulties implicated
in embryo disposal.319
Yet, one grave difficulty with freezing the gametes separately involves
current technological limitations, because such a process is much less likely
to lead to a live birth.320 Even if technology were to develop so that this
317. See discussion supra Part III.A (describing Louisiana statute mandating donation of
unwanted embryos).
318. See discussion supra Part III.A (describing the current position in many states on
awarding custody of embryos when a couple is divorcing).
319. Katheryn D. Katz, The Legal Status of the Ex Utero Embryo: Implications for
Adoption Law, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 303, 335 (2006) (“There is no question that freezing
unfertilized eggs, rather than embryos, would obviate the difficult legal and moral issues
associated with embryo cryopreservation.”); Virginia Godoy, Note, Where Is Biotechnology
Taking the Law? An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Technology, Research on Frozen
Embryos and Human Cloning, 19 J. JUV. L. 357, 369 (1998) (“Freezing eggs dispenses with
the ethical and legal dilemma of disposition of unused frozen embryos and other issues
associated with frozen embryos.”).
320. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 619-20
(2011) (discussing the lower success rates when eggs are frozen separately); see also Katz,
supra note 319, at 335 (“Although freezing human eggs is possible, there is still debate over
its efficacy in IVF treatment. At the present time the freezing of ‘human oocytes still
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option would be a more reliable choice, the would-be parents would still be
confronted with a difficult choice, assuming that freezing the eggs
continued to be less likely to eventually lead to a live birth. The woman
would go through the difficult and painful process involved in harvesting
eggs;321 the couple would then have to decide whether to create as many
embryos as possible so that they could maximize their chances of having a
child without having to undergo the harvesting process again.322 But
divorce rates are high, which means that the couple might have to decide
what to do with any remaining frozen embryos if their marriage failed.323
Or, the couple could decide to freeze the gametes separately, thus making it
less likely that they would be able to achieve their dreams of having a child.
IV. Conclusion
Several states have considered or will soon consider the adoption of
personhood amendments. While such amendments would not themselves
modify federally-protected rights to privacy, these rights seem somewhat
precarious because of both the way the jurisprudence has been developing
and the possibility that membership on the Supreme Court will change. If
the Court were to hold that the Constitution gives the States more latitude
with respect to their ability to regulate access to abortion and contraception,
then a State’s adoption of a personhood amendment might effectuate
sweeping changes with respect to privacy rights within that state.
Even if there are no changes to current privacy jurisprudence,
personhood amendments would significantly affect other areas of criminal
and civil law. The focus here is on the effects on assisted reproductive
technologies. Such amendments might well affect the availability of clinics
and would certainly affect the decisions that would-be parents might make
generally yields unsatisfactory results and is therefore considered experimental,’ so it cannot
be said to be the answer to the dilemma of frozen embryos.” (footnotes omitted)); Godoy,
supra note 319, at 368 (“Once the technology for the freezing of human eggs becomes
reliable, freezing eggs and sperm separately could replace freezing embryos.”).
321. Tracy J. Frazier, Comment, Of Property and Procreation: Oregon’s Place in the
National Debate over Frozen Embryo Disputes, 88 OR. L. REV. 931, 935 (2009) (“Because
the process of harvesting a woman’s eggs is invasive and expensive, and repeated attempts
at implantation are often required, doctors prefer to harvest multiple eggs at once.”).
322. Id. (“The eggs are then fertilized simultaneously, creating viable embryos. Of these
embryos, several will be selected for implantation into the woman’s uterus using a transfer
catheter, while the others will be frozen in the event that the first implantation is
unsuccessful.” (footnotes omitted)).
323. See Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of Family
Reunification, 11 NEV. L.J. 629, 638 (2011) (discussing high divorce rates).
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about how to achieve their dreams of having a family. While such
amendments would certainly affect, for example, whether embryos could be
donated for research,324 they would also affect decisions that families might
make when deciding whether or how to bring children into the world. Such
amendments also might add to the cost of what is already an extremely
expensive undertaking. Further, some couples who would shudder at the
thought of their children being raised by someone else would simply decide
that the risks were too great and decide not to try to have children at all.
Both amendment proponents and opponents fail to appreciate some of the
significant effects that the adoption of such laws might have, and all parties
might be both surprised and disappointed by some of the foreseeable
consequences of such an amendment’s adoption.

324. See Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human
Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L.
& MED. 119, 140 (2007) (“Individual states may amend their state constitutions to legally
define a human being as beginning at the time of conception and to confer personhood upon
the unborn. Individual states may enact criminal, tort and other laws that outlaw abortion,
violence against wanted unborn human beings, embryonic stem cell research, and cloning.”).
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